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JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE COMMON-LAW TRADITION
JOHN C. H. WU*

Case law is the most characteristic product of the Anglo-Saxon
genius. From the standpoint of its substance, it had assimilated a
good deal of Christian ideas in its formative stage during the Middle
ages. But it is of its mode or functional aspect that I am now speaking. From this standpoint we can readily agree with Sir William
Holdsworth that "English lawyers have invented a wholly original
method of developing law."' Nor was Burke exaggerating when he
said about case law that "nothing better could be devised by human
wisdom than argued judgments publicly delivered, for preserving
unbroken the great traditionary body of the law, and for marking...
every variation in the application and the construction of particular
parts ... ."2 Briefly, case law may be described as "a method of developing law which preserves the continuity of legal doctrine, and
is, at the same time, eminently adaptable to the needs of a changing
society."3 On the whole, it is not far from the truth to say that "it

hits the golden mean between too much flexibility and too much
rigidity .... -"4 But what makes it so matter-of-fact and racy of the
soil is to be found in Holdsworth's further observation that "this
method keeps the law in touch with life, and prevents much unprofitable speculation upon academic problems which serves only to
illustrate the ingenuity of the speculator." 5 Here we find reflected
some of the most salient characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon mind:
the predilection for the concrete, the aversion to speculation, the
practical sense of the useful, the reliance on experience, the view
of law as an integral part of life, the readiness to adapt its rules to
the changing needs of men, the cautious striking out upon new paths,
and instinctive response to the new values and novel situations constantly presented by a growing civilization. The common law is not
laid out by rule and line. It is un chemin qui marche, to borrow a
phrase from Pascal. It is life coping with life. It is like managing a
wild horse by a robust "horse sense." There is method in its madness.
A well-known French publicist of the last century, Emile Boutmy,
compared the English Constitution "to a river whose moving surface
*

Professor of Law, Seton Hall University. Author, Fountain of Justice

(1955); Cases and Materialson Jurisprudence (1958).
1. HOLDSWORTH, EssAYs IN LAw AND HISTORY 159 (1946).
2. BuRKE, WORMs 453 (Bohn ed. 1901).
3. HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 159.
4. Id. at 162.

5. Ibid.
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glides away at one's feet, meandering in and out in endless curves,
now seeming to disappear in a whirlpool, now almost lost to sight in
the verdure." 6 It is just because it meanders in and out in endless
curves that it has permeated gradually the soil of the whole land,
and the people have come to regard it as a part of their lives. No one
to my knowledge has made a happier comparison between the French
constitutions and the constitutions of England and the United States.
Slow changes, careful transitions, which follow and reflect the natural
progress of events; half concealed and almost unconscious transformations,
which do not run counter to consecrated formulas until innovation has
secretly gained over the instincts of the people, and has allied itself with
long custom-all these different forms of growth take place more easily
in England, and even in the United States, than in France.... A French
constitution may be likened to a town defended by a single wall without
any redoubts inside it. A breach once made, the enemy pours in and
occupies the position. The two Anglo-Saxon Constitutions, on the other
hand, are well provided with these internal defences; by their very nature
they could never go through those sudden transformations, which are so
often in advance of the needs and ideas of the people. . . . They are
endowed with an elasticity, and with a capacity for adaptation, which
have up to this day insured to them a far longer existence than has been
granted to the classic constructions and the 'eternal mansions' of French
coristitution-makers. 7
These words are true of the common law as a whole. The spirit of
the common law permeates even the constitutional systems of England
and the United States.
I have dwelt so long upon this because it is quite impossible to
understand and appreciate the judicial method of Justice Holmes
without taking into account the fact that he was steeped in the
tradition of the common law. Whether he was dealing with cases in
constitutional law, or in criminal law, or in civil law, whether he
was dealing with the problems of legal education or with philosophy,
art and letters, you will find the same emphasis on the concrete as
against the abstract, on insights as against systems, on experience
as against logic, on practical good sense as against speculative reasoning. Even when he was talking about the universal, he meant a very
concrete thing, the cosmos, which was to him "only an empirical
8
fact."
In a speech on the use of law schools, delivered in 1913 before the
Harvard Law School Association, he declared:
For whatever reason, the Professors of this School have said to themselves
more definitely than ever before, We will not be contented to send forth
students with nothing but a rag-bag full of general principles-a throng
6. Bounvny, STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2, 3 (Dicey transl. 1891).
7. Id. at 171-72.
8. 1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 810 (Howe ed. 1953).
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of glittering generalities, like a swarm of little bodiless cherubs fluttering
at the top of one of Correggio's pictures. They have said that to make a
general principle worth anything you must give it a body; you must show
in what way and how far it would be applied actually in an actual system; you must show how it has gradually emerged as the felt reconciliation of concrete instances no one of which established it in terms. 9

In defending the Langdell method of teaching law through the cases,
he said: "Why, look at it simply in the light of human nature. Does
not a man remember a concrete instance more vividly than a general
principle. And is not a principle more exactly and intimately grasped
as the unexpressed major premise of the half-dozen examples which
mark its extent and its limits than it can be in any abstract form of
words?"' 0 In these words one hears the very voice of the common
law.
The same voice is heard when he declares from the bench such

apercus as:
Great constitutional provisions must be administered with caution. Some
play must be allowed for the joints of the machine, and it must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare
of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.11
The Constitution does not make it a condition of preventive legislation
that it should work a perfect cure. It is enough if the questioned act has
a manifest tendency to cure or at least make the evil less. 12
[TIhe law allows a penumbra to be embraced that goes beyond the outline of its object in order that the object may be secured. A typical
instance is the prohibition of the sale of unintoxicating malt liquors in
order to make effective a prohibition of the sale of beer.' 3
When a legal distinction is determined, as no one doubts that it may be,
between night and day, childhood and maturity, or any other extremes, a
point has to be fixed or a line hag to be drawn, or gradually picked out
by successive decisions, to mark where the change takes place. Looked
at by itself without regard to the necessity behind it the line or point
seems arbitrary. It might as well or nearly as well be a little more to
the one side or the other. But when it is seen that a line or point there
must be, and that there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it
precisely, the decision of the legislature must be accepted unless we can
say that it is very wide of any reasonable mark .... If it is right as to the
run of cases a possible exception here and there would not make the
law bad.14
[T]he character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which
9. Howv~Es, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERs 42 (1920) [hereinafter cited as C.L.P.]
10. C.L.P. 44.
11. Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904).
12. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge, 278 U.S. 105, 115 (1928).
13. Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 241 (1926).
14. Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 41-42 (1928).
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it is done. . . .The most stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. 15
[I]f there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls
:for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought-not free
thought for those who agree with us but freedom of the thought that
-wehate.16
In all these utterances there is a certain mellowness and sweet
xeasonableness, a certain catholicity and largesse characteristic of
the best tradition in the common law jurisprudence. It is to be noted
-that most of these cases have to do with what St. Thomas has called
"'determinations of the natural law."'1 These concrete determinations
are based on some general precepts of the natural law, in the sense
-that where there exists an actual necessity for a clear legal distinction, the law-giver must provide one for the sake of the common good.
.But such positive legal distinctions cannot in the nature of things
_possess perfect rectitude. They can only be more or less reasonable.
This is what Holmes meant when he said that most distinctions are
.matters of degree. The judges, in passing upon the constitutionality
of a statute laying down such a distinction, should not pronounce it
arbitrary simply because they think that a better distinction could
have been made. As Holmes said in his opinion in Otis v. Parker:
"Considerable latitude must be allowed for differences of view, as
-well as for possible peculiar conditions which this court can know but
imperfectly, if at all."s8 There is a penumbra of reasonableness in all
:such particular determinations of the natural law. It is in these
penumbral regions of the law that Holmes is most in his element.
The enchanted garden of the common law is full of shady groves
-which cheer your heart and refresh your spirit at the same time that
they lure you on to new vistas. It is not a closed garden, but one
which is continuous with the wild fields, hills and rivers on one side,
and leads to the streets and highways on the other. At first you feel
all but lost in the labyrinthine paths and by-paths; you want to
-discover some design but there is none. But daily saunterings in the
garden familiarize you gradually with the genie of the place, the
atmosphere, and the ever-changing moods of the garden, with the
inevitable result that you are more and more fascinated by it. You
begin to divine a certain vague design, but the element of surprise
is never lacking, because it seems to change with the weather and
assumes a new aspect when a new season arrives. Perhaps you find
some traces of human planning here and there, but you are not able
15. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
16. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 654-55 (1929).
17. See AQUINAS, SUMmA THEOLOGICA, I, II, Q. 95, art. 2 in corpore.
18. Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 608-09 (1903).
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to tell exactly where nature ends and art begins. And, in fact, there
is no design, except perhaps the design of nature. What you find is
not logical consistency, arrived at once and for all, but organic adaptation which must be renewed every day.
The most significant lesson that a student of comparative law learns
from the common law lies in its marvellous combination of stability
and progress. Dean Pound, who is too cosmopolitan a jurist to be
charged with narrow provincialism, has testified to the real merits of
the case law.
The chief cause of the success of our common-law doctrine of precedents
as a form of law is that it combines certainty and power of growth as no
other doctrine has been able to do. Certainty is insured within reasonable
limits in that the court proceeds by analogy of rules and doctrines in the
traditional system and develops a principle for the cause before it according to a known technique. Growth is insured in that the limits of the
principle are not fixed authoritatively once for all but are discovered
gradually by a process of inclusion and exclusion as cases arise which
bring out its practical workings and prove how far it may be made to
do justice in its actual operation.19
Professor Seavey has gone a step further in showing us an inside
view of the judicial process. "The judicial advocates of progress," he
writes,
have not intended to change principles of English law. They have merely
sought to make the rules to accord more nearly with the fundamental
6onceptions of justice which underlie the specific rules. To preserve
archaic individual rules in a modern society, to fail to respond to changing ideals and needs, necessarily saps the vitality of the law. Without
change, the law must obey the order of all living things and die. It is
one of the glories of the common law that its capacity for change enables
it to remain human and vital. The common law was and should remain
as the response of the judges to the civilisation of the times in view of its
history. There is no principle of common law which prevents the weeding
out of historical anachronisms or the correction of judicial errors, and this
without resort to Parliament. The judges have at times succeeded in making changes without appearing to do so, through the use of legal fictions;
old formulas are given new interpretations to create new rules. Thus
the rule given to the assignability of contracts was destroyed through
the fiction of a power of attorney; the liability of an agent for failing
to have the authority which he purports to have is based upon the fictitious promise put into his mouth by the courts, as also is the quasi contractural liability enforced in an action formerly called general assumpsit.
Sometimes older cases are explained away by restricting their effect
within a narrow compass. Sometimes a court relies only upon justice or
common sense or notes the divergence of a right from the principle which
gave it birth. In whatever manner the result has been accomplished, it is
clear that the common law has moved with the development of economic
needs and judicial insight.20
19. PouND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 182 (1921).
20. Seavey, Candler v. Crane, Christmas & Co.: Negligent Misrepresentation
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All this bears out the subtle point made by Holmes that our continuity with the past is only a necessity but not a duty. "The tree
has grown as we know it. The practical question is what is to be
the next organic step." 21
The fact that Holmes was steeped in the spirit of the common law
furnishes one of the most important clues to the understanding of his
mind. It may also be said that the common law runs in his blood.
This is why it is not easy to say whether Holmes is an idealist or
a positivist. He is both, just as the common law is a combination
of the actual and the ideal. 22 At any rate, no one seems to know more
intimately the mode, if not the inner soul, of the common law. "The
truth is," says Holmes, "that the law is always approaching, and
never reaching, consistency. It is forever adopting new principles
from life at one end, and it always retains old ones from history at
the other, which have not yet been absorbed or sloughed off. It will
become entirely consistent only when it ceases to grow."2 3 This is
truly a penetrating insight into the modality of the common law and,
for that matter, of any system of living law. But what is of even
greater importance for our present purposes is that it reveals in all
nakedness the interior landscape of Holmes himself.
It was Emerson who said that a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds. Be that as it may, consistency is not a virtue of
the mind of Holmes. Like an innocently mischievous child, he seems
to take a special delight in contradicting not only others but himself.
Often he was aware of his inconsistency, but he found solace in the
thought that it was a sign of aliveness and perfectibility. Francis
Biddle has put it very well: "If there were contradictions in his own
being, they were fused by a belief that extremes need not be reached
before a line can be drawn. And if morality was but a check on force,
by Accountants, 67 L.Q. REV. 466, 468 (1951).
In Dwy v. Connecticut Co., 89 Conn. 74, 99, 92 Atl. 883, 891 (1915), Wheeler,
J., has said something to the same effect: "That court best serves the law
which recognizes that the rules of law which grew up in a remote generation
may in the fullness of experience be found to serve another generation badly,
and which discards the old rule when it finds that another rule of law represents what should be according to the established and settled judgment of
society, and no considerable property rights have become vested in reliance
upon the old rule. It is thus great writers upon the common law have discovered the source and method of its growth, and in its growth found health and
life. It is not and should not be stationary. Change of this character should
not be left to the Legislature." See also the opinions of Justice Lusk in Hinish
v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941); and Judge Crane in
Oppenheim v. Kridel, 236 N.Y. 156, 140 N.E. 227 (1923).
21. C.L.P. 289.
22. That Holmes is not a positivist pure and simple has been ably brought
out by Mark DeWolfe Howe in his article on The Positivism of Mr. Justice
Holmes, 64 HAav.L. Rxv. 527 (1951).
23. HOLMEs, THm COMMON LAw 36 (1881) [hereinafter cited as COMMON
LAW].
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he would none the less spend a life in asserting the value of courage,
of truth, of tolerance. Contradictory? Certainly, he would have
answered, but so too is life full of contradictions." 24
To take one instance out of many, once he wrote me: "I am interested by your account of what you have been reading. On the
other hand, I after having freed my mind by declaring that . . .the
literature of the past is a bore, I have been reading old books this
summer .... Just now I am finishing the Odyssey. I read it rather
slowly even with a translation alongside. It has suggested some reflections to me-too long to put on paper-but I have been surprised
to find that it gave me very considerable pleasure." 25 To a drily logical reader, he would appear to be contradicting himself flatly. Since
he thought the literature of the past a bore, why did he continue to
read Homer, Plato, Tacitus, Seneca, Plutarch, Plautus, and the Gospel? In fact, in his studies of the common law, he had gone right to
the origin, to Glanville and Bracton, to the Year Books and Doctor
and Student. His interest in history and the classics was very strong,
so strong that he had to beware of the pitfall of antiquarianism. His
inborn sense of balance seldom went to sleep. What appears to be
logical inconsistency was really the result of psychological self-adjustment and compensation. In a speech to learned scholars of Harvard, he uttered a warning against pedantry. "Learning, my learned
brethren," he said,
is a very good thing. I should be the last to undervalue it, having done
my share of quotation from the Year Books. But it is liable to lead us
astray. The law, so far as it depends on learning, is indeed, as it has been
called, the government of the living by the dead. To a very considerable
extent no doubt it is inevitable that the living should be so governed. The
past gives us our vocabulary and fixes the limits of our imagination; we
cannot get away from it. There is, too, a peculiar logical pleasure in
making manifest the continuity between what we are doing and what has
been done before. But the present has a right to govern itself so far as
it can; and it ought always to be remembered that historic continuity
with the past is not a duty, it is only a necessity.26

Here again we find the spirit of the Janus-faced common law at
work. Rooted in the old, the common law is constantly adapting
itself to the new. As he says, "We must alternately consult history
and existing theories of legislation." 27 Learned as he was, he could
say: "We must beware of antiquarianism, and must remember that
for our purposes our only interest in the past is for the light it throws
upon the present."28 On the other hand, he was also aware that
24. BIDDLE, MR.JUSTICE HOLmES 126-27 (1942).

25.
26.
27.
28.

Letter From Oliver Wendell Holmes to J. C. H. Wu, Sept. 6, 1925.
C.L.P. 138-39.
Co nWoN LAW 1.
C.L.P. 194-95.
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history will move on and what is new today will be old tomorrow.
There is a provincialism of epoch as there is a provincialism of
place. 29 The Promethean spirit of Holmes refuses to be attached and
bound to anything short of the Whole. "Our own word seems the
last always; yet the change of emphasis from an argument in Plowden
to one in the time of Lord Ellenborough, or even from that to one in
our day, is as marked as the difference between Cowley's poetry
and Shelley's. Other changes as great will happen. And so the eternal
procession moves on, we in the front for the moment; and, stretching
away against the unattainable sky, the black spearheads of the army
that has been passing in unbroken line already for near a thousand
years." 30
It was Burke who said that law sharpens the mind by narrowing
it. With Holmes, the study of the common law has indeed sharpened
his mind, but at the same time it has broadened his vision until he
could see it as an "eternal procession." This, no doubt, is partly due
to his poetic insight, but one feels that his intimate knowledge of
the common law had a great deal to do with giving birth to this
insight. At least, the marvelous adaptability of the common law reinforced the native intellectual flexibility of Holmes. He learned from
the common law the importance of constant self-transcending in order
to keep on living and growing.
In this respect, no critic of Holmes has shown a deeper insight into
his true significance for modern jurisprudence than Dr. Miriam T.
Rooney. In her estimate:
Much of what Mr. Justice Holmes wrote and did has unusual merit. He
fought valiantly against the formalism of logic which in its decadent days
got itself separated from its substance and cast a ghostly blight on legal
vigor. He contended always against the neglect of experience in providing conditions for advancement and progress. He recognized, though not
with desirable consistency, the power of reason to analyse problems presented by experience and to solve them constructively for the attainment
of valued ends. These, along with many other features of his writing,
marked a considerable improvement over Bentham and Maine and the
other writers upon whom he drew.31
In this, as she says, Holmes is in the great'tradition of the common
law. In fact, no jurist seems to me to have embodied more perfectly
the modality of the common law.
On the other hand, there can be no denying that Holmes did not
pay sufficient attention to the liberalizing and humanizing influence
of Christianity on the formation and development of the common
law. Competent historians of the common law, like Maitland, Pollock,
29. See

WEAVER, IDEAS HAVE CONSEQUENcEs

30. C.L.P. 140.
31. RooNFY, LAWLESSNESS,

67 (1948).

LAW, AND SANCTION

135 (1937).
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Holdsworth, and Plucknett have with one voice testified to the profound influence that Christianity exercised on the English law, especially in its formative stage. Speaking of the Anglo-Saxon period,
Plunknett has written:
[T]he Church brought with it moral ideas which were to revolutionise
English law. Christianity had inherited from Judaism an outlook upon
moral questions which was strictly individualistic. The salvation of each
separate soul was dependent upon the actions of the individual. This
contrasted strongly with the custom of the English tribes which looked
less to the individual than to the family group of which the individual
formed a part. Necessarily such a system had little place for an individualistic sense of morals, for the group . . . can hardly be credited
with moral intention that an individual can. With the spread of Christianity all this slowly changed.32
Perhaps it would have been more accurate to say "personalistic"
instead of "individualistic," but the main idea is clear enough. Even
in the present century, Lord Sumner, while denying the validity
of the sweeping statement that "Christianity is part of the law of
England," had to admit, "Ours is, and always has been, a Christian
State. The English family is built on Christian ideas, and if the
national religion is not Christian there is none."
.In fact, the very idea of a government by law and not by men,
as it has been developed in the common-law countries, came from
Christianity. Ever since the days when the Apostles were saying to
the powers that be, "We ought to obey God rather than men,"3 there
has been a continuous tradition, which is still vital today. Rooted
in natural reason, it has been confirmed by faith and made invincible
by grace. "Set aside justice," says St. Augustine, "and what are kingdoms but enterprises of robbery?"3 5 St. Isidore of Seville says: "If
the king rules rightly, he will keep the name of king; by transgressing he will lose it."36 So John of Salisbury: "The only and supreme
difference between the tyrant and the prince is that the prince
governs the people according to law and obeys the law himself while
the tyrant rules the people by his arbitrary will.... The prince fights
for the laws and the liberty of the people. The tyrant considers he
has done nothing unless he has made the laws void and reduced the
people to servitude." 37 Bracton, whose works have been called "the
32. PLUCKNETT, CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 8-9 (5th ed. 1956).

33.
34.
35.
36.

Bowman v. Secular Soc'y, Ltd., [1917] A.C. 406, 464.
Acts 5:29.
AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD, bk. IV, c. 4.
"Recte igitur faciendo regis nomen tenetur, peccando ammittitur." IsiDORE OF SEVILLE, ETYMOLOGIARUM, bk. IX, § 3.
37. "Est ergo tiranni et principis haec differentia sola vel maxima, quod hic
legi obtemperat et eius arbitrio populum regit . . . ." JOHN OF SALISBURY,
PoLIcRATIcUs, bk. IV, c. 1. "Princeps pugnat pro legibus et populi libertate;
tirannus nil actum putat nisi leges evacuet et populum devocet in servitutem."
Id. at bk. VIII, c. 17.
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crown and flower of English medieval jurisprudence, 38 touched the
very springs of the spirit of true democracy and the reign of law
when he wrote:
The king himself, however, ought not to be under a man but under God,
and under the Law because the Law makes the king. Therefore let the
king attribute to the Law what the Law attributes to him, namely,
dominion and power; for there is no king where will, and not law, wields
dominion. That as a vicar of God he ought to be under the Law is clearly
shown by the example of Jesus Christ whose place he takes on earth.
For although there lay open to God, for the salvation of the human race,
many ways and means beyond our telling, His true mercy chose this way
especially for destroying the work of the devil: he used, not the force of
his power, but the counsel of justice. And thus He wished to be under
the Law 'that He might redeem those who were under the Law;' for He
was unwilling to use power, but judgment. Thus also the blessed parent
of God, the Virgin Mary, mother of the Lord, who by a unique privilege
was above the Law, for the sake of giving an example of humility did
not recoil from following lawful ordinances. The king should act likewise, lest his power remain unbridled.39
In fact, it was in the spirit of the common law, as Bracton understood it, that Thomas More could declare on the scaffold that "he
died the King's good servant, but God's first." As his modern
biographer has observed, "he died for the right of the individual
conscience, as against the State. '40
These ideas are no mere rhetoric; they are the hidden roots from
which the common law has grown into such a magnificent elm,
putting out great branches, "so that the birds of the air can dwell
beneath its shade."'41 If one's attention is concentrated upon the
branches, leaves and flowers, it is all too easy to forget its roots, to
say nothing of the soil and atmosphere from which the tree has
constantly drawn its vital nourishment. Quite apart from the question of personal faith, it is simply unhistoricalto treat of the common
law without going seriously into its Christian foundations. In 1886,
in a speech on "The Puritan," Holmes said: "Whether they knew it
or not, they planted the democratic spirit in the heart of man. It is
-to them we owe the deepest cause we have to love our country,that instinct, that spark that makes the American unable to meet his
fellow man otherwise than simply as a man, eye to eye, hand to
hand, and foot to foot, wrestling naked on the sand."42 After thus
gracefully acknowledging the great works of the Puritan ancestors,
he played the enfant terrible and made a public confession which
38. 1 POLLOCK & MAILTAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 206 (1903).
39. BRACTON, DE LEGIBus, bk. I, c. 8, § 5. I have done the translation with

the help of Rev. Edward Synan.
40. CHAMBERS, THoMAs MORE 400 (1935).
41. Mark 4: 32.
42. HoLmEs, SPEECHES 19 (1900).
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almost sounded like a death-knell to Puritanism: "I confess that my
own interest in those thoughts is chiefly filial; that it seems to me
that the future lay in the heads of Bacon and Hobbes and Descartes,
rather than in that of John Milton. I think that the somewhat isolated
thread of our intellectual and spiritual life is rejoining the main
stream, and that hereafter all countries more and more will draw
43
from common springs.'
It is significant that he should have mentioned Bacon, Hobbes, and
Descartes. The strains of empiricism, positivism and rationalism had
begun to influence his mind.
He had not forgot his Christianity entirely. In The Common Law,
he did not hesitate to assert: "The degree of civilization which a
people has reached, no doubt, is marked by their anxiety to do as
they would be done by."" Then he went on to say, "It may be the
destiny of man that the social instincts shall grow to control his
actions absolutely, even in anti-social situations." Finally came the
"but." "But," he said, "they have not yet done so, and as the rules of
law are or should be based upon a morality which is generally
accepted, no rule founded on a theory of absolute unselfishness can
be laid down without a breach between law and working beliefs. '45
This passage reveals many things about the mentality of Holmes.
To begin with, it is obvious that his thought is grounded on the
Golden Rule, which he rightly considers as the ultimate and objective
test by which human civilization is to be measured. Here he
unconsciously touched one of the primary precepts of the natural
law. As Christ Himself has told us, "[F]or this is the law and the
prophets."46 Holmes is also right in thinking that the Golden Rule
cannot without more ado be enacted into human law and enforced
with all its equipment of police force, and that to be effective human
law must adapt itself to the degree of civilization a people has
actually reached. Here he shows the good sense similar to that of
St. Thomas, who had said, "human law is framed for a number of
human beings, the majority of whom are not perfect in virtue.
Wherefore human laws do not forbid all vices, from which the
virtuous abstain, but only the more grievous vices, from which it is
possible for the majority to abstain . . . . '47 Nor does it prescribe
all the acts of every virtue, but only some with a view chiefly to the
common good. Here, Holmes and St. Thomas agree. But the trouble
with Holmes is that he has not co5rdinated these two truths, as St.
Thomas had done. He does not seem to see the distinction between
43. Id. at 21.

44. COMMON LAw 44. (Emphasis added.)
45. Ibid.
46. Matthew 7:12. (Emphasis added.)
47. AQuwNAs, SUMMA THEOLOGIcA, I, II, Q. 96, art. 2 in corpore.
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a goal and a standard. The standard must not be set too high, but
the goal should always be kept in mind. Without the goal there can
be' "no intelligent discussion about progress. In the words of St.
Thomas, "The purpose of human law is to lead men to virtue, not
suddenly, but gradually. '48 St. Thomas integrates human law with
the Golden Rule without confusing them. In the hands of Holmes,
the two threaten to fall apart. He tends to think that since the
Golden Rule cannot be enforced absolutely and overnight, it is to
be dismissed from the field of jurisprudence as being something
irrelevant or too remote. This leads inevitably to the sterile separation of law from ethics, and of human law from the law of nature.
Where St. Thomas thinks in terms of more or less, Holmes, under
the influence of Austin, seems to think in terms of all or nothing.
St. Thomas's view of the law is dynamic, because the goal constantly
exercises a hydraulic pressure on the legal process. Holme's view is
static, 'because he holds the mirror exclusively to the prevailing
standards- of morality. I am aware that Holmes was dynamic enough
in many of his decisions and dissents, but I am now speaking of his
professed philosophy, which seems to leave a hiatus between the
actual and the ideal and does not furnish a satisfactory foundation
to what he did as a judge.
. IBut what he has lost in faith and in understanding very frequently
resurges from his heart. In 1923, he wrote to Laski:
I wish you would develop more at length your grounds for disliking our
constitution. Of course it has the 18th century emphasis and Bagehot
criticised forcibly the division of powers-but I suspect that you don't
like the bill of rights of former days-whereas I have been rather led
to the belief that we have grown so accustomed to the enjoyment of those
rights that we forget that they had to be fought for and may have to be
fought for again.4 9
When a man is willing to fight for something and die for it, it means
that he sets a higher value upon it than life. Apropos of Hindus's
Hlumanity Uprooted, he wrote to Laski in 1930, "I gather from the
book and more from other sources that the Communists have killed
so far as they could those who did not agree with them and want
to kill the rest. They present a case where I fail to see that war is
absurd '" 50 While intellectually he was too saeptical to say that his
preference for a free world had cosmic validity, morally he was
willing to fight and die, even at the age of eighty-nine, for that world.
In 1928, in the famous "wire-tapping" case, he wrote a dissent which
reveals that the Puritan in him was still very much alive. He said,
48. Id. at I, II, Q. 96 art. 2, ad 2.
49. 1 HOLMES-LAsKI LETRns 529-30 (Howe ed. 1953).
50. 2 id. at 1291.
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"We have to choose, and for my part I think it a less evil -that some
criminals should escape than that the Governmenit should play an
If the existing code does not permit district attorignoble part ....
neys to have a hand in such dirty business, it does not permit the

judge to allow such iniquities to succeed."5' 1 This is no longer merely

the modality of the common law, it is its very spirit, that we are

witnessing. I suspect that he shuns the moral tone because he is so
full of it. As Dr. Peter J. Stanlis so keenly observes, "[T]he corridors
5' 2
of Holmes' legal pragmatism echoed the hushed diction of morality.
To many lawyers, one of his greatest opinions is his dissent in
the child-labor case. 53 The case had to do with the constitutionality

of the Keating-Owen Act of 1916, which prohibited the transportation
in interstate commerce of any products from factories in which chil-

dren were employed. Dagenhart had two sons, one under.:fourteen
and one between fourteen and sixteen, working in a North- Carolina
textile mill, who would have been allowed to work under the law
of the state which only forbade child labor under twelve, but who
were affected by the federal ban. He sued for an injunction against
the United States District Attorney, Hammer, to prevent him from
enforcing the law. The federal district court held the law unconstithtional and the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, by a five-tofour decision. In his majority opinion, Mr. Justice Day takes the
position that, while Congress has the power to exclude from interstate* commerce goods which are intrinsically harmful, it has no
power to exclude goods which "are of themselves harmless" simply
on the ground they have been produced by child 1b1or. To do so
would be to meddle with the internal affairs of the state.
In his minority opinion, joined in by Justices McKenna, Brandeis,
and Clarke, Justice Holmes takes the position that to forbid transportation in interstate commerce of such goods is not to meddle
with the affairs of the state, but simply to-uphold the public policy
of the nation with regard to child labor. If Congress has the power
to exclude goods likely to work harm, it must also havethe power
to exclude "the product of ruined lives." "It does not matter whether
the supposed evil precedes or follows the transportation. It is enough
that in . the opinion of Congress the transportation encourages the
evil." Of course the law cannot undertake to prohibit all evils. "But
if there is any matter upon which civilized countries have agreedfar" inore than they have with regard to intoxicants and some other
rnatfer s 6er which this country is now emotionally aroused-it is
51. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928).

52.. Stanlis, Dr. Wu. and Justide-Holmes: A -Reappraisalon Natural- aw, 18
U. DsFr. L.J. 149, 163 (1955).

53. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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the evil of premature and excessive child labor." The opinion concludes with a masterly sample of judicial reasoning:
The act does not meddle with anything belonging to the States. They
may regulate their internal affairs and their domestic commerce as they
like. But when they seek to send their products across the state line
* they are no longer within their rights. If there were no Constitution and
no Congress their power to cross the line would depend upon their neighbors. Under the Constitution such commerce belongs not to the States but
to Congress to regulate. It may carry out its views of public policy whatever indirect effect they may have upon the activities of the States. Instead of being encountered by a prohibitive tariff at her boundaries the
State encounters the public policy of the United States which it is for
Congress to express. The public policy of the United States is shaped
with a view to the benefit of the nation as a whole.... The national welfare as understood by Congress may require a different attitude within
its sphere from that of some selfseeking State. It seems to me entirely
constitutional for Congress to enforce its understanding by all means at
its command. 54
Here you see Justice Holmes at his best, and you will be reminded
of some of the high spots in the writings of Edmund Burke. A subtle
judicial imagination and a vigorous legal analysis are united with
a statesmanlike concern for the nation as a whole. Here logic and
experience, philosophy and common sense, work harmoniously together. At the bottom of it all is a half-concealed moral judgment of
a true humanist who pretends to shun the moral tone. "I should
have thought," he says, "that if we were to introduce our own moral
conceptions where in my opinion they do not belong, this was preeminently a case for upholding the exercise of all its powers by the
55
United States."
The last quoted sentence reveals a quality quite characteristic of
Holmes. He likes to talk low and act high. In theory, moral conceptions are not supposed to enter into judicial decisions; in practice
moral judgment surges from the depth of his heart in spite of his
professed theory. His theory is as wrong-headed as John Austin, but
his instinct is as sound as the common law. The truth, of course,
is that, as Judge Dillon says: "[E]thical considerations can no more
be excluded from the administration of justice, which is the end
and purpose of all56civil laws, than one can exclude the vital air from
his room and live."
Twenty-three years after Hammer v. Dagenhartwas decided, it was
overruled in 1941 in the case of United States v. Darby,5 7 and the dis54. Id. at 281. (Emphasis added.)
55. Id. at 280.
56. DILLON, THE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENcE oF ENGLAND AND AMERICA 17
(1894).
57. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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sent of Holmes became law. Chief Justice Stone, speaking for a
unanimous Court, says, "In that case it was held by a bare majority
of the Court over the powerful and now classic dissent of Mr. Justice
Holmes setting forth the fundamental issues involved, that Congress was without power to exclude the products of child labor from
interstate commerce." 58 After reviewing the authorities, Chief Justice
Stone continues, "The conclusion is inescapable that Hammer v.
Dagenhartwas a departure from the principles which have prevailed
in the interpretation of the Commerce Clause both before and since
the decision and that such vitality, as a precedent, as it then had, has
59
long since been exhausted. It should be and now is overruled.
According to Max Lerner, when the decision of the Darby case
was read in the court room, one lawyer was heard to remark that
he thought he heard a peal of mellow laughter from the sky.60 By the
same token there must have been a continual series of such peals
of mellow laughter. The Adkins case was overruled in 1937 by the
decision of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,61 where Chief Justice
Hughes vindicated the Holmes dissent in the Adkins case by saying,
"What can be closer to the public interest than the health of women
and their protection from unscrupulous and overreaching employers?
And if the protection of women is a legitimate end of the exercise of
state power, how can it be said that the requirement of the payment
of a minimum wage fairly fixed in order to meet the very necessities
of existence is not an admissible means to that end?" 62 After quoting
from the dissent of Justice Holmes, he solemnly declared that "the
case of Adkins v. Children's Hospital, supra, should be and is over63
ruled."
Likewise, Coppage v. Kansas,64 which invalidated a statute of
Kansas making it a criminal offence for an employer to make nonmembership in a union a condition of continued or prospective employment, and in which Holmes wrote a brief dissent, was overruled
in 1941 by the decision of Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB.65 In Olsen v.
Nebraska,66 which had to do with a Nebraska statute fixing the
maximum compensation that a private employment agency might
collect from an applicant for employment, Mr. Justice Douglas, speaking for a unaminous Court, reaffirmed the judicial views of Holmes
in all such cases almost in a wholesale manner. "In final analysis," he
58. Id. at 115-16.
59. Id. at 116-17.
60. LERNER, TI

61.
62.
63.
64.

AftND AND FAnrH op JusTIcE HOLMES 168 (1943).

300 U.S. 379 (1937).
Id. at 398.
Id. at 400.
236 U.S. 1 (1915).

65. 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
66. 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
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said,
the only constitutional prohibitions or restraints which respondents have
suggested for the invalidation of this legislation are those notions of
public policy embedded in earlier decisions of this Court but which, as
Mr. Justice Holmes long admonished, should not be read into the Constitution. .

.

. Since they do not find expression in the Constitution, we

cannot give them continuing vitality as standards by which the constitutionality of the economic and social programs of the states is to be determined. 7
In an overwhelming number of cases that have been decided by the
Supreme Court and other courts during the past quarter of a century,
one easily discerns the echoes of the voice of Justice Holmes, whether
his name is explicitly mentioned or not. It is an unprecedented
phenomenon in the judicial history of any country that the dissents
of a single judge should have become the dominant opinion on so
many points in the course of a few decades. It has been a posthumous
landslide for the spirit of the "Venerable Old Justice," One often
wonders how he would have felt if he were still living today. Unless
I am greatly mistaken, he would repeat the same words he had
written me in 1930: "So long as one is on the firing line, one lives
in eternal doubt, because the question is not 'Did I do something well
last year?' but 'Shall I do well today and tomorrow?'-sB Whatever
one may say about his final credo, the modality is that of the Saints
of the Church, who have taught in one accord that, in the interior
69
life of man, not to advance is to fall back.
How the judgments of Holmes in all the cases involving social
legislation fall in line with the great social Encyclicals of Leo XIII
and Pius XI, has been ably brought out by John J. O'Connor in his
book The Supreme Court and Labor, published in 1932 by the Catholic University of America. More recently, in a pamphlet on Economic
Liberalism and Free Enterprise,Father Banjamin L. Masse, S.J., has
also passed favorably upon the soundness of Holmes's dissents in the
light of Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Ano.
But the question is, how did he arrive at such sound judgments
when the prevailing judicial philosophy was that of ultra-individualism, which used to justify itself in the name of a perverted versiorn
of natural law and natural rights? He did not justify his position
by the Thomistic philosophy of the natural law, of which he knew
nothing. He arrived at his position instinctively, because he was more
profoundly steeped in the tradition of the common law than any of
his brethren, and the common law was, in turn, steeped in the true
67. Id. at 246-47.

68. Letter From Oliver Wendell Holmes to J. C. H. Wu, Veb. 28, 1930.

69. I have expounded this doctrine at length in Wu, THE INTERIOR CARMEL:
THE THREEFOLD WAY OF LovE (1953).
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spirit of Christianity.7
Laski once wrote to Holmes:

Did I remark to you that I am beginning to discover that there is a
genuinely English mind? I see that when I talk to Wallas, who is full of
real insights, can never concentrate on any subject, never argue about
it abstractly, is always driven to the use of a concrete illustration, is
rarely logical and about eight times out of ten patently in the right. Well,
say you, the life of the law has been experience and not logic; but I think
these English (I write with the detachment of an outsider) specialise in
subconscious processes the implications of which they don't understand.71

This seems to give a good picture of the mode of the common law;
and the mode of the common law constitutes the dominant note of
the mind of Holmes. Whatever may have been his conscious philosophy of life and of law, his instinct is that of the common law. He was
living on the inheritance of Christian jurisprudence, without realizing what the world would be like if all were squandered. We are
witnessing a tremendous revival of interest in "the laws of nature
and of nature's God." In this movement, Holmes will be remembered
as one who revolted heroically and successfully against the straitjackets of a legal Phariseeism, which used the name of God and His
laws in vain. His destructive efforts have cleared the way for a new
constructive era of American jurisprudence.
Dr. Rooney has put it very well:
On the activities of the American jurists of the future, the final estimate

of Mr. Justice Holmes' life work rests. If the way he leaves open be

utilized to restore the pristine vigor of the common law system, his name
will signify the inauguration of a new era and a new hope. If, on the
contrary, his doctrine of sanction be construed narrowly and accepted
literally, it cannot but mark the end of an unhappy century, begun by
the well-intentioned Bentham, which in becoming more and more lawless,
has yielded less and less freedom.72

This is what I would call a "historical judgment," which Holmes
himself would have liked, for he never regarded himself as more
than a strategic point in the campaign of history.
In the recent years, there have not been lacking signs pointing to
"a new era and a new hope." To mention just one out of many, the
opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Steel Seizure Case,73 may
be regarded as a straw in the wind. Our democracy, he says,
implies the reign of reason on the most extensive scale. The Founders of
this Nation were not imbued with the modern cynicism that the only
70. See among other books O'SuLLivAN, THE INHETANCE OF THE COMMON
LAW (1950).
71. 1 HOLMES-LAsKI LETTERS 303 (Howe ed. 1953).
72. ROONEY, LAWLESSNESS, LAW, AND SANCTION 136

(1937).

73. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 143 U.S. 579 (1952).
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thing that history teaches is that it teaches nothing ....
For them the
doctrine of separation of powers was not mere theory; it was a felt
necessity. Not so long ago it was fashionable to find our system of checks
and balances obstructive to effective government. It was easy to ridicule
that system as outmoded-too easy. The experience through which the
world has passed in our own day has made vivid the realization that the
Framers of our Constitution were not inexperienced doctrinaires.74
This, I surmise, is exactly what Holmes himself would have said in
view of the lessons of experience. Anyway, I know of no one who
knows the mind of Holmes more intimately than Justice Frankfurter.
In conclusion, I wish to say that a true philosophy of law has
nothing to lose but everything to gain from the lessons of experience
and from the practical judicial wisdom of the legal artists. For both
the art and the philosophy of law are based upon the reign of reason,
and both are indispensable for its full realization.
74. Id. at 593.

